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ABSTRACT 
Whereas prosecutions in international criminal courts have 
increasingly included charges of rape, the messy realities of justice 
reveal that many witness testimonies are never heard, convictions are 
limited, sentences are not served, reparations are not paid and 
women who bring cases to trial become social outcasts. This research 
examines the ways in which the norms and vocabularies of 
international criminal justice concerning sexual violence in genocide 
and mass conflict mediate localized understandings of witness 
testimony ultimately affecting the ability of international courts to 
bear witness to the injustice of rape. The work examines the 
construction of official narrative as moral outrage regarding rape in 
international criminal trials versus the injustice of rape within the 
sociocultural and political context that shapes local perceptions of 
justice and the dynamics of change. This work argues that official 
narratives regarding rape in the ICC, ICTY and ICTR have resulted 
in epistemic injustices in which the testimony of women is often 
silenced, rejected and ignored through notions of the nature of 
generalized violence and political engagement. The work concludes 
by taking up the question of what are the duties to bear witness and 
how do failures in social and cultural capabilities contribute to the 
legal ambiguity regarding international understandings of gender-
based violence. 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent instability in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) began with the 1994 Rwandan genocide that led to two wars in 
the region. The 1998 war, also known as Africa’s World War, 
officially ended in 2003. Joseph Kabila was elected in 2006 in an 
election heavily financed and monitored by the International 
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Community. At this time, the rebel forces were integrated into the 
Congolese national military, the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), and, until shortly after the 2011 
elections when the M23 rebel group again brought instability to North 
Kivu, remained generally stable. 
It was only in 2003, at the end of the war that had claimed more 
than five million lives, when the international community became 
aware of massive rapes in the DRC2 and not until 2006 when it began 
to react by launching large-scale international campaigns to fight 
sexual violence and support victims.3 As Christof Ruhmich, who has 
been working in South Kivu with Malteser International for twenty 
years, observed, the international community arrived too late.4 By the 
time rape became the focus of international attention, the war had 
ended and rape had become more a profitable NGO business. 
Trying to gain a genealogical sense of rape in the Congo, it turns 
out that this was actually not the first time the international 
community was concerned about rape in the Congo. The first was in 
1906 when an international coalition drew attention to the conditions 
in the Congo Free State. Clergy and laymen, at that time, sent a letter 
to Secretary of State Elihu Root in Washington, “calling his attention 
to conditions in the Congo Free State, and urging him on behalf of the 
American people to use the ‘moral support’ of the Nation to wipe out 
whatever abuses may be found.”5 Among the “measures and 
practices” listed was “[t]he employment under the authority of the 
Government as sentries of cruel, brutish black, chosen from hostile 
tribes, who murder, pillage, and rape the people for whose protection 
the Government is avowedly established.”6 
After independence from Belgium in 1960, when the mineral-rich 
province in southeastern Congo, Katanga, formally declared its 
secession from the new Republic of Congo, the new Premier, Patrice 
Lumumba, regarded Katanga’s provincial Premier, Moise Tschombe, 
as a Belgian puppet and the Deputy Premier, Antoine Gizenga, 
accused the United Nations of being complicit in ‘“a war of colonial 
reconquest’ waged by the Belgians” by allowing the Belgians to 
 
2 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR: SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE EASTERN CONGO (2002). 
3 Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff, Ending Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, 34 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 13, 19 (2010). 
4 Interview with Christof Ruhmich (Sept. 3 2011) (on file with author). 
5 Appeal to Root to Help End Congo Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1906. 
6 Id. 
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remain armed while systematically disarming the newly independent 
Congolese.7 He further accused the UN policy of “systematic looting” 
of the country, corrupting the Congolese way of life and inciting 
conspiracies “while accusing the Congolese of ‘rape.”8 On February 
28, 1961, a New York Times article reported that a woman employee 
of the United Nations was raped in a suburb of Leopoldville by 
Congolese soldiers,9 and a March 14, 1961 headline Terror in Congo 
Related by Nuns: U.N. Gets Reports of Rape and Pillage in Kivu, 
reported “rape, pillage and degradation of nuns by Congolese soldiers 
in Kivu Province” where victims were “stripped, beaten and 
terrorized by rioting Congolese soldiers in the Maniema region of 
Kivu,” with one American missionary girl saying that she had “been 
raped by four Congolese soldiers.”10 A headline on November 7, 
1961, read: Whites Attacked by Congo Troops: 15 Women Raped in 
Kasai.11 Writing on Key Chapters in Congo’s Tragedy, the New York 
Times depicted in photos events since Congo’s independence on June 
30, 1960, and descent into war with an introductory paragraph stating: 
“In the year and a half of its independence it has seen massacre, 
pillage and rape among the people. . . .”12 
In yet another report on January 12, 1962, President Moise 
Tshombe of Katanga Province charged that “central Congolese troops 
has massacred 1,000 civilians at Kongolo, in northwestern Katanga” 
and “raping hundreds of women in the area near the juncture of Kivu 
and Kasai Provinces.”13 Once the secession of Katanga had been 
quelled and most whites had left the Congo, reports of rape in the 
Congo no longer appeared in the New York Times, but a 1963 feature 
article entitled The Congo Tries to Build an Army wrote of the 
difficulty in welding undisciplined troops, torn by tribal loyalties 
stating that “it must outgrow much of its heritage. Some of the army’s 
least admirable habits can be traced back to the eighteen-eighties 
when the Belgians began recruiting Congolese to replace the Zanzibar 
 
7 Henry, Tanner, Hammarskjold Bids Belgium Clarify Stand on Katanga, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 1960. 
8 Id. 
9 Henry Tanner, Congo Soldiers Attack U.N. Aides in Leopoldville, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
28, 1961. 
10 Terror in Congo Related by Nuns: U.N. Gets Reports of Rape and Pillage in Kivu, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1961, at 3. 
11 Whites Attacked by Congo Troops: 15 Women Raped in Kasai, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
1961, at 1. 
12 Key Chapters in Congo’s Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1961. 
13 David Halberstam, Gizenga, In Shift, Pledges Return, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1962, at 
2. 
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guards used in the earliest explorations.”14 These troops, known as the 
“Force Publique” were “used to expel Arab slave traders and protect 
white settlers,” but the “Congo Reform Association complained that 
‘wherever [the Force Publique’s] operations have ranged, native 
livestock has almost totally disappeared [and] women have been 
raided in enormous numbers to satisfy its lusts.”15 
Although not in the press, rapes were documented throughout the 
1960s and 1970s as part of local administration tactics by academics 
such as Thomas Callaghy16 writing on Mobutu’s rule in, what is now 
called Zaire. In his study of the State-Society Struggle in Zaire, 
Callaghy documented the administrative practices of national 
authorities in two subregions, Bas-Ziare and North-Kivu. His focus 
was the tasks of political order, control of key societal groups, 
extraction, the search for compliance with the regime’s policies, and 
staff control, which, as he wrote, “are at the heart of Zairian 
absolutism.”17 The Mobutu absolutist state maintained a state of 
emergency in Kivu even after it was lifted for other areas of the 
country in 1967, stating that: “The enemy is still within our walls and 
the danger remains.”18 “In late 1972, army units were still attempting 
to eradicate the last remnants of opposition to the new regime in the 
Walikale Zone of Nord-Kivu Subregion. . . . Assassinations, 
kidnappings, and human sacrifices were still being practiced 
according to administrative and military officials. . . . Subregional 
officials also constantly watched ‘the subversive movement called 
‘Kanyarwanda,’ ‘an opposition group active among the large 
Rwandan refugee population in Nord-Kivu, particularly in Masisi 
Zone where the refugees outnumbered the Zairians.”19 
According to Callaghy, the deeply rooted regionalism and local 
particularism meant that the local populations tended to view state 
administration (police and army) as an occupying force and had “little 
interest in obeying the laws.”20 Crime was endemic, especially 
banditry and armed robbery that affected “just about everyone—
missions, businesses large and small, state offices and houses, 
 
14 J. Anthony Lukas, The Congo Tries to Build an Army, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1963. 
15 Id. 
16 THOMAS M. CALLAGHY, THE STATE-SOCIETY STRUGGLE: ZAIRE IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (1984). 
17 Id. at 277. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 278. 
20 Id. at 281. 
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foreigners, travelers, residents of large towns and the smallest 
villages, peasants, and workers” and, “[f]ed by the problems of the 
rural exodus, urban crowding, unemployment, and opposition to the 
absolutist regime, organized groups of bandits have operated 
widely.”21 In Nord-Kivu, the bandits came from Rwanda.22 
In seeking to assure order and security, Callaghy describes the 
gendarmery practice of ratissages. The ratissage was a “major control 
and extraction tool of the Zairian absolutist state.”23 These were 
conducted late at night when troops and gendarmes would start to 
arrive in trucks and be distributed to various assembly points. The 
ratissage would begin at about 6 A.M. when troops and gendarmes 
moved “systematically from house to house, street to street, from one 
locale to another, demanding people to ‘present their identification 
cards in order to see if they had paid their taxes and fulfilled other 
requirements.’”24 Victims of the ratissage reported that “soldiers and 
gendarmes committed robberies and rapes, beat people, committed 
‘other abuses about which one does not dare reveal the secret because 
it is shameful.’”25 Further accounts document that the Zairian military 
constantly abused the subject population through “theft, extortion, and 
armed robbery of all kinds; arbitrary arrest; illegal fines; setting up 
unauthorized barricades; kidnappings; beatings; rapes; forced labor” 
such that “the traditional chief of Gombe-Sud complained in 1972 
that the current situation is worse than it was under colonial 
domination” citing that “[t]he girls and even old women are often 
violently raped.”26 And that in “1971 and early 1972 the zone 
commissioner for Kimvula reported serious problems with the local 
police contingent. One police agent raped several women . . . another 
raped a fourteen-year-old girl and then coerced her parents into 
dropping charges against him . . . a fourth severely beat a young girl 
of fourteen for refusing to have sexual relations with him.”27 The zone 
commissioner for Songololo was “forced to suspend nightly patrols 
by the military in September 1971 because the soldiers were setting 
up unauthorized barricades, demanding ‘drinking money’ from 
people, and raping women at will.”28 In Bas-Zaire, on June 19, 1972, 
 
21 Id. at 283. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 287. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 289. 
26 Id. at 294. 
27 Id. at 295–96. 
28 Id. at 296. 
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“[s]everal soldiers severely beat a school director who had tried to 
stop the rape of a thirteen-year-old girl and a male nurse who had 
tried to prevent the rape of hospitalized women. A twelve year-old 
girl was raped in her village. . .”29 
Perhaps because the rapes documented by Callaghy in Zaire were 
part of local Congolese opposition and regionalism in the outlying 
provinces, they were not considered something to report on in an 
international newspaper. The only report was by the Los Angeles 
Times where a headline read: Zaire Refugees Say Rebels Went on 
Rape, Killing Spree in their hunt for, the article stated, “the white 
man” in the Kolwezi fighting (Shaba) in Katanga, Zaire’s copper-
mining capital.30 A French survivor reported, “I saw three Katangans 
rape a 10-year-old girl in the presence of her parents and three 
brothers.”31 There were a number of reports of the “Katanga 
terrorists” that included “large-scale rape of white women”32 in the 
Los Angeles Times in that year, but once that international incident 
subsided, no mention of rape was made again until on February 3, 
1994, when the New York Times reported on a State Department 
report which, for the first time, focused on treatment of women in its 
annual human rights report.33 
Even though the instability in the DRC began in late 1994, it was 
not until 2003, when the war ended that the New York Times ran its 
first headline of rape in the Congo, U.N. Says Congo Rebels Carried 
Out Cannibalism and Rapes.34 This was followed on June 9, 2003, 
with Somini Sengupta’s New York Times article: Congo’s Warring 
Factions Leave a Trail of Rape.35 In that article Sengupta quoted 
Mathilde Mahindo, the woman who runs the Centre Olame, a church 
run rape victim center, as saying that discussing sex is taboo in 
Congolese society and “talking about sexual assault is even less 
acceptable.”36 She added further that ‘“[r]ape doesn’t have a place in 
 
29 Id. at 297. 
30 Zaire Refugees Say Rebels Went on Rape, Killing Spree, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1978. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Steven Greenhouse, State Dept. Finds Widespread Abuse of World’s Women, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at A1. 
34 U.N. Says Congo Rebels Carried Out Cannibalism and Rapes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2003, at A5. 
35 Somini Sengupta, Congo’s Warring Factions Leave a Trail of Rape, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 9, 2003. 
36 Id. 
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the culture . . . sexual attacks have become endemic and have gone 
virtually unpunished, as soldiers from one armed group after another 
have seized villages, pillaged homes, taken women and taken women 
or girls at the point of a gun or knife.”37 At that point numerous 
articles appeared citing a new culture of rape in the Congo as the 
country headed towards its first national elections since Patrice 
Lumumba was elected after independence and the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) began to consider taking up the violence in the 
Congo as its first case. 
Rape was a focus point of DRC reconstruction after the 2003 peace 
agreements that included the Sun City Agreement creating a multi-
party government headed by Joseph Kabila and the Pretoria Accord 
promising Rwandan withdrawal in exchange for the commitment to 
disarm the Hutu militias. Through the influence and pressure of the 
international community, the new Congolese government passed an 
amendment to the 1940 Penal Code adding specific crimes of sexual 
violence (2006 Rape Law)38 designed to be in accordance with 
international standards for the crime of rape and sexual violence more 
broadly. The two-part 2006 Rape Law provided a formal definition of 
rape to include both men and women and criminalized acts of sexual 
assault and mutilation, sexual harassment, sexual slavery, forced 
prostitution, and forced marriage.39 It also toughened up sentencing 
and changed the legal age of a minor from fourteen to eighteen 
criminalizing sexual relations with anyone under age eighteen with or 
without consent.40 Procedurally, it mandated that judicial proceedings 
cannot last longer than three months and prevented the use of 
character accusations or the victim’s past actions from being used 
against her or him. Significantly, the law did not prohibit spousal rape 
and, although the 2006 Constitution declared the government’s 
commitment to eliminating all forms of discrimination against women 
and to combat all forms of violence against women in the public and 




38 Law number 06/018 modifying and completing the Congolese penal code, July 20, 
2006; Law number 06/019 modifying and completing the Congolese criminal procedure 
code, July 20, 2006. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. The Family Code, however, continued to permit women to marry at fifteen. 
41 The Penal Code was originally enacted in 1940. See Democratic Republic of the 
Congo: Domestic and Sexual Violence, Including Legislation, State Protection, and 
Services Available to Victims (2006–March 2012), IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD  
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The emphasis on “zero tolerance” by the international rule of law 
efforts such as the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative 
(ABA ROLI) program, meant that victims of sexual violence who 
wanted to pursue justice in the courts would have to agree not to 
pursue any form of mediation or other local forms of justice. While 
international actors heralded the formal enactment of the 2006 Rape 
Law as an end of impunity for sexual violence, local NGO legal aid 
providers emphasize that in making funding for the reconstruction of 
DRC contingent on the introduction of the Rape Law, the 
international community failed to understand the particularities of 
Congolese culture regarding women and the role that informal justice 
played in the lives of victims and communities. In other words, 
international efforts and legal instruments do not easily map onto 
local contexts. Six years later, most sexual crimes continue to go 
unpunished “because of judicial inaction and a legal culture at odds 
with the changes. The laws, ignored and misinterpreted, have left 
escalating numbers of sexual violence survivors unprotected, and 
perpetrators free to violate again.”42 
The pressure to enact a rape law in 2006 can be best understood 
within the broader international normative framework that had just 
started developing concerning sexual violence and the recognition of 
the crime of sexual violence through initiatives designed to provide 
greater security to women and girls in conflict zones. There have been 
a number of UN Security Council Resolutions focused on the security 
of women in conflict beginning with the passage in 2000 of 
Resolution 1325 on the “protection of women and girls during war 
and conflict,”43 Resolution 1888 which appointed a Special 
Representative on sexual violence in conflict,44 and Resolution 1820 
which called for the “immediate and complete cessation by all parties 
to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians with 
immediate effect.”45 Regionally, the 2008 International Conference of 
the Great Lakes Region Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression 
of Sexual Violence Against Women and Children has been working 
 
OF CANADA, Apr. 17 2012, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f9e5e532 
.html. 
42 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Analysis: New Laws Have 
Little Impact on Sexual Violence in DRC, IRIN HUMANITARIAN NEWS AND ANALYSIS, 
June 7, 2011, available at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid =92925. 
43 S.C. Res.1325, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000). 
44 S.C. Res 1888, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009). 
45 S.C. Res 1820, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1820 (June 19, 2008). 
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to end impunity and provide legal, medical, and material assistance 
(including compensation) to victims.46 
In March 2004 the government of the DRC referred the “situation 
of grave crimes allegedly committed on the territory of the Congo to 
the [ICC]” and, on June 21, 2004, the Chief Prosecutor announced his 
decision to open the Court’s first investigation47 into “grave crimes 
allegedly committed on the territory of the . . . DRC since July 1, 
2002.”48 In issuing his announcement, Prosecutor Luis Moreno 
Ocampo noted that “reports pointed to ‘a pattern of rape, torture, 
forced displacement and the illegal use of child soldiers.’”49 
Investigations led to arrest warrants against six individuals, four of 
whom have been apprehended. The trial against Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (Lubanga) became the first completed trial process with a 
judgment issued in March 2012 and sentencing him to fourteen years 
imprisonment for the enlistment, conscription and use of child 
soldiers.50 The first trial to include gender-based crimes, the Germain 
Katanga (Katanga) & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Ngudjolo) trial, 
concluded in early 2012. It was not until 2008, however, that the 
United Nations Security Council, in a unanimous vote, formally 
declared rape a “weapon of war” with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon stating that violence against women had reached “unspeakable 
proportions” in some societies recovering from conflict.51 The 
resolution, sponsored by the United States, “expressed reservations 
during the negotiations” by China, Russia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, 
“asking whether rape was really a matter for the security council.”52 
The official narrative of DRC rape that has emerged over the past 
decade has been one linked to the Rwandan genocide and the trade in 
illegal minerals by rebel warlords. The narrative points the main 
blame for massive rape in the DRC primarily on the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), comprised of Rwandan 
 
46 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION, PROTOCOL ON THE 
PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
art. 2 (2006). 
47 See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, THE HAGUE JUSTICE 
PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=6174 (last visited Apr. 21, 
2013). 
48 WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, GENDER REPORT CARD ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2012 97 (2012) [hereinafter GENDER REPORT CARD]. 
49 Id. 
50 See id. 
51 UN Classifies Rape a ‘War Tactic,’ BBC NEWS (June 20, 2008), http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7464462.stm. 
52 Id. 
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Hutus who had fled deep into the Congo forests after the 1994 
genocide and National Congress for the Defence of the People 
(CNDP), a Tutsi rebel group led by Laurent Nkunda who had been a 
senior official in the Congolese Rally for Democracy in the eastern 
Congo Kivu provinces during the war and continued to launch attacks 
until 2006 when his troops were integrated into the FARDC as part of 
the peace agreement.53 The CNDP mixed brigades continued to 
launch attacks against the FDLR and generate instability in the 
region. In the summer of 2012, a splinter group of the CNDP renamed 
the M23 for the March 23, 2009, peace agreement the CNDP signed 
with the DRC government, escalated fighting in North Kivu stating 
that the November 2011 elections failed to produce promised changes 
in governance and conditions. 
With the FDLR seen as the main cause of the instability and 
massive rapes, in 2009–2010 the international community funded the 
FARDC campaign against the FDLR (Kimini II and Amani Leo) 
believing that chasing the FDLR back into Rwanda would solve the 
problem. Instead, these campaigns were fraught with human rights 
abuses and massive rapes increased. The international press and local 
Congolese declared the DRC the “Rape Capital of the World” and, 
increasingly, the term a “culture of rape” has been used to explain the 
persistence of rape that has continued steadily, even though 
international money has poured in for rule of law and SGBV 
programs.54 The narrative of a “culture of rape,” places the root cause 
of rape in the DRC as “foreign” in the form of the FDLR and CNDP 
soldiers who had been integrated into the FARDC but continue to 
prey on the local population.55 The standard narrative is captured by a 
2009 U.S. Congressional Report56: 
 
53 See Séverine Autesserre, Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and 
Their Unintended Consequences, 111 AFR. AFF. 202 (2012); JASON K. STEARNS, 
DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT 
WAR OF AFRICA (2011); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: 
RENEWED CRISIS IN NORTH KIVU 19 (2007). 
54 UN Official Calls DR Congo ‘Rape Capital of the World,’ BBC News (Apr. 28, 
2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8650112.stm; Flynn Lloyd-Davis, Why Eastern DR 
Congo is ‘Rape Capital of the World,’ CNN (Nov. 25 2011), http://www.cnn.com 
/2011/11/24/world/africa/democratic-congo-rape; Lauren Wolfe, End Culture of Rape in 
2013, CNN (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/01/opinion/wolfe-end-rape-in      
-2013/index.html. 
55 According to The Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice, Congo has one of the most 
serious incidences of gender based violence and human rights violations in the world. 
GENDER REPORT CARD, supra note 48. The DRC was until recently, a country emerging 
from years of armed conflict which has perpetuated rape and sexual violence as a weapon  
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The prevalence of sexual violence has been attributed to the eroded 
status of women over years of conflict, weak state authority, a weak 
justice system, and a breakdown in community protection 
mechanisms. Sexual violence by the military has also been linked to 
waves of integration of rebel organizations into the military through 
successive peace accords, with little accompanying attention to 
military discipline or the chain of command. Military troops are 
poorly paid, and troops deployed in conflict areas are not provided 
adequate food or supplies, which some observers believe 
encourages looting and other abuses. Reports suggest that while 
most sexual crimes are carried out by members of armed groups in 
conflict zones, incidents or rape by civilians are also increasing. 
One report expressed concern that rape may have “become 
trivialized and has been increasingly perpetrated in zones of relative 
stability.57 
The framing vocabulary of sexual violence in the report as caused by 
an “eroded status of women over years of conflict,” “breakdown in 
community protection” and an unpaid, uncared for military has its 
international criminal justice counterpart in the vocabulary of rape as 
a “weapon of war” that is “systematic” in the DRC and targeted 
towards inciting fear in the local population as part of the conflict 
over minerals.58 But the narrative of women and girls strategically and 
systematically targeted in epidemic proportions does not tell the full 
story of rape in the DRC or the local context that made the extreme 
violence inflicted upon women (and men) by armed groups over the 
last ten years possible. The report mentions that “[f]ew reliable 
statistics exist on sexual violence in most African countries and that 
data collection is not a component of most U.S. programs. Little is 
known, additionally, about the effectiveness of individual programs in 
reducing the scale of violence.”59 
Whereas one can tell the story of rape in the DRC as a part of the 
regional conflict over land rights and minerals, the view that emerges 
from a study of the scholarship and journalistic accounts of the Congo 
since the late 1880s suggests that rape in the Congo has been, at 
different times, part of the international narrative of the conquest, 
 
of war. DRC’s capital city of Kinshasa was dubbed the “capital of rape” by the UN special 
rapporteur Margot Wallström. In South Kivu alone 54,000 cases of rape were reported in 
the first six months of 2010. According to an Al Jazeera report, one commonly quoted 
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56 See also Janine de Vries, Sexual violence against women in Congo: Obstacles and 
Remedies for Judicial Assistance 36–37 (2007); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2. 
57 ALEXIS ARIEFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40956, SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN AFRICAN 
CONFLICTS 18 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 23. 
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Belgian rule, struggle for independence, secession of Katanga, 
character of the undisciplined military, Mobutuism administration 
and, now, Rwandan and Ugandan influence in the conflict over 
minerals, ever since the first Western colonizers arrived. Whereas the 
assumption of the Congressional Report, as representative of the 
dominant international narrative concerning Congo as “the Rape 
Capital of the World,” is that rape is foreign to the Congo and 
developed out of a context of genocidaires (known as “Interahamwe”) 
who continue to wreak havoc in the region through a war over 
minerals—the broader time frame reveals the short sightedness of this 
narrative in terms of understanding rape in the Congo.60 It also shows 
how, what I term, the international moral outrage at rape in the 
Congo has always ebbed and flowed with international interests in the 
country that, in different ways has differentiated between blameless 
victims of sexual violence, who are caught in the conflict, and 
regrettable civil forms of rape that do not require international 
attention. A fundamental problem with this differentiation is that in 
the current conflict international organization data shows that the 
majority of rapes in the Congo between 2004 and 2008 were 
perpetrated by civilians, not soldiers. 
Understood as an act of war, rape has been treated through short-
term post-conflict construction efforts. International and regional 
programs to combat rape are filtered through a number of local outlets 
including rule of law programs, mobile gender courts, sexual violence 
sensitization trainings, SGBV programs, economic integration 
initiatives, and gender empowerment programs. This has produced, at 
the local level, what some have referred to as “NGO Justice” or an 
NGO industry in sexual violence.61 In different respects the NGO 
industry in sexual violence is both part of and separate from the 
everyday reality of rape in the DRC. Over the course of two years, I 
observed and interviewed local lawyers, NGOs, religious workers, 
medical staff, women groups, communities, and bystanders 
throughout South Kivu and sought the testimonies of rape victims in 
order to better understand local perceptions of justice. In line with the 
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work of scholars such as Kay Schaffer and Sidone Smith,62 Kimberley 
Theidon,63 Erin Baines64 and April Shemak,65 my interest is in 
testimonial discourse as the expression of everyday justice, repair 
and, ultimately, social transformation.66 In particular, my interest is in 
the way in which international norms and vocabularies of rape have 
filtered into the testimonial discourse of rape at the local level. More 
broadly, my concern is with how emerging legal norms of testimony 
concerning sexual violence relate to the concerns for social justice for 
victims of sexual violence in mass atrocity. 
Instead of highlighting the practices that violate internationally 
accepted human rights standards or assessing customary justice 
against an idealized formal legal system,67 my research examines the 
formal system as it functions in the “messy realities” of justice reform 
taking into account “the sociocultural and political context that shapes 
local perceptions of justice and the dynamics of change.”68 As Isser 
states, “actual practice and everyday experience, far more than any 
written laws, determine the nature and quality of justice accessible to 
the population. . . . [E]mpirical practice rather than written codes must 
serve as our starting point in any rule-of-law assessment—we need to 
examine the justice landscape as the population sees and acts in it.”69 
Particularly relevant for this study, Isser found the need for more 
focused research attention on how the dynamics of legal pluralism 
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327 (Deborah H. Isser ed., 2011). 
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affect women’s rights, not just in terms of normative discrimination 
and access to formal and informal systems, but “to examine how 
rights are mediated by social norms and community power holders, 
and how to harness mechanisms of change.”70 
Rule of law programs in eastern Congo were implemented to end 
impunity by criminalizing rape in accordance with the internationally 
drafted 2006 Rape Law through a “zero tolerance” policy for 
customary or informal practices such as mediation. In keeping with 
the findings of Isser, I found that the decision to prohibit local justice 
practices in response to sexual violence has resulted in unintended 
local results. In particular, there is a stark gap between the ability of 
the legal system to produce judgments and its inability to end 
impunity or better the lives of victims of sexual violence. 
Although the focus of criminal justice in the DRC is on ending 
impunity for sexual violence, the deeper concern of women in the 
Congo is social justice. They share a story of victimhood that is 
rooted in social inequality, poverty, and gender disparities and 
oppression that is not uncommon for women worldwide. Their 
situations are similar to other situations, such as Japanese comfort 
women, where there is military predation on local populations and 
sexual slavery, but where, ultimately, rape is a story of poverty and 
gender inequality.71 In the DRC, however, there has been an 
unprecedented international rule of law effort to end impunity 
demanding an inquiry as to whether testimonies of sexual violence, 
mediated through international criminal justice norms and 
vocabularies, can contribute to broader concerns for social justice. In 
other words, does the individual act of testifying to all the facts 
necessary to successfully convict a perpetrator of rape relate to or 
contribute to the life of the testifier? And, does the act of testimony 
collection, practiced by the international criminal justice industry, 
contribute to social transformation at the local level? These social 
justice concerns include the economic integration of women, 
educational opportunities, right to own land, and concerns for gender 
equality that include a focus on domestic violence, early marriage, 
and incest. 
We live in a world where “human rights discourses, norms, and 
instruments depend upon the international commitment to 
narratability, a commitment to provide, according to Joseph 
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Slaughter, ‘a public, international space that empowers all human 
beings to speak.’”72 But, “[w]hether or not storytelling in the field of 
human rights results in the extension of human justice, dignity, and 
freedom depends on the willingness of those addressed to hear the 
stories and to take responsibility for the recognition of others and 
their claims.”73 Schaffer and Smith recognize that in this contestation 
over human rights, only certain stories emerge and are able to lay 
claim to a right and justice. In a world of uneven power relationships, 
only certain speakers of crimes and injustice are able to have their 
narratives championed by the human rights community and, mainly, 
only when they are intelligible to Western understanding of 
victimhood and suffering.  In other words, what is required to become 
a testifier is not just the desire to speak, but also a normative 
framework and vocabularies that allow the testifier to speak in her 
own words and an international community with the ability to bear 
witness to the atrocity, as common place or outrageous as it may be.74 
In other words, with an understanding that, within the local 
vocabulary, rape may not be understood as a crime as western 
morality would have it, but it may be understood within vocabularies 
of injustice. 
The human rights moment for sexual violence did not come with 
the WWI War Crimes Commission of 1919 inscription of rape and 
forced prostitution among the thirty-two violations of the laws of war, 
the knowledge by Nuremberg prosecutors of rapes in WWII who 
opted to focus only on Crimes of Aggression nor with the UN 
adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. At that time, 
violence against women was not considered a human rights violation 
or a war crime. It was only in 1992 that CEDAW included gender 
violence as a form of discrimination.75 But even the emergence of 
international instruments and the opening of institutions of justice 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and, more recently, the ICC to prosecution of the crime of rape, has 
not shifted the fundamental ambiguity surrounding rape more 
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generally. Whereas the general proposition of the human rights 
movement is that the collectivization of testimony can raise 
awareness of a human rights abuse and provide a global space for 
justice, this has not been the case of victims of sexual violence in the 
DRC who continue to live everyday lives of the broader injustice of 
rape. Unlike the benefits of collective testimony, Schaffer and Smith 
highlight such as enabling “new forms of subjectivity and radically 
altered futures,”76 a way to claim “new identities and assert 
participation in the public sphere,”77 the official narrative of rape that 
has emerged from the DRC is an abbreviated one focused on 
Rwandan genocidaires and the conflict over minerals that is legible to 
western audiences’ understanding of rape as completely outside of 
Western moral comprehension and, therefore, justifies prosecutorial 
intervention in an international tribunal. 
I 
MORAL OUTRAGE AND THE INJUSTICE OF RAPE 
Within this narrative of rape as a weapon of war, new norms and 
vocabularies of sexual violence have emerged and are, at the local 
level, filtered through rule of law and other SGBV programs. If 
“vernacularization is the process through which individuals and 
institutions appropriate and customize human rights discourses in 
ways that make sense in their own cultural space,”78 what happens to 
testifiers across the legal fora where norms of testimony, as 
expressions of power, contribute to the rejecting, ignoring and 
silencing of speakers? The question of who speaks, on what terms, 
and towards what ends, is a question of power. In the ICC, only 
certain people get to be heard, certain charges and theories of atrocity 
crimes are pursued and, for those who do come forth as witnesses, 
only certain testimonies are heard or valued as part of the legal theory 
explored and argued by the prosecution. 
As Pamela Scully points out, “discourses about gender-based 
violence and the suffering of women create particular cultural and 
political subjects, which often accompany and can come to subvert 
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some of the other powerful enabling ideas of human rights.”79 The 
rise of empathetic sensibility80 that helped create the context in which 
the notion of human rights took hold81 has, I argue, been replaced by 
an international criminal justice regime based on moral outrage. 
Unlike empathy which assumes a capacity to imagine people from far 
away as somehow connected to one through shared humanity,82 moral 
outrage objectifies people as “other” than oneself and, as such, in 
need of being saved and in need of being brought back into the world 
of “humanity.” Whereas empathy seeks to address injustice (social, 
economic, etc.) as part of the condition and challenge of humanity, 
moral outrage demarcates the space of humanity (as the secure space 
the international community occupies) as separate from victims and 
wrongdoers who are outside of humanity, existing in the space of 
insecurity. International moral outrage is premised on values that 
define who is the victim and the wrongdoer and is generally tied to 
narratives of Western foreign policy as played out in the Security 
Council. Justice is, therefore, the process of bringing “humanity back 
in,” to the values and framing of western politics and narrative of 
security. 
In his 1978 book Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and 
Revolt, Barrington Moore examined how people who are victims of 
their societies feel about and explain the circumstances of their lives. 
“What are their notions of injustice and thereby of justice, and where 
do these ideas come from?”83 It is essentially a study of moral 
outrage, “the social and historical conditions under which moral 
outrage did and did not put in an appearance.”84 But, Moore said that 
he could not have it be about moral outrage since: 
People of little education and refinement are certainly capable of 
feeling anger, but the word “moral” carries overtones of 
condescension and introspection that miss both the tone and 
concreteness of much popular anger. At the same time there is a 
clearly moral component to this anger. Hence “injustice,” or the 
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sense of injustice, captures the tone and content of these expressions 
more accurately.85 
The international attention to rape in the Congo, however, does carry 
overtones of condescension and introspection and is, therefore, moral 
outrage. 
Moore wrote about local contexts, but the growth of humanitarian 
interventions renders it important to examine the international 
phenomenon of moral outrage. Whereas it seems obvious that the 
international community should respond to reports of massive rape in 
the Congo with moral outrage, it becomes less obvious when we 
consider that rape is a pernicious worldwide problem. And, even less 
obvious that rape in the Congo could be solved through the use of 
criminal justice strategies in the Congo, a place that justice has eluded 
for over a hundred years, when criminal justice has been unable to 
end impunity for rape anywhere in the world, even in the United 
States. There is the additional question as to the limited focus of the 
moral outrage as, for example, only when committed against Tutsi 
women in Rwanda although there was also evidence of rapes of Hutu 
women by RPF troops during the Rwandan genocide86 and only when 
considered a crime against humanity by rebel forces, but not when it 
is deemed opportunistic as part of military combat such as the rape of 
women in Ituri by different warring factions including the Congolese 
military and humanitarian aid workers. 
It is, therefore, relevant to examine the norms and vocabularies of 
the international crime of rape as a weapon of war and crime against 
humanity, on the one hand, and, what Barrington Moore would call, 
the injustice of rape in eastern Congo. The injustice of rape is both 
distinct from the international moral outrage and connected to it in so 
far as local actors seek justice through the medium of international 
criminal justice. I share the concern of scholars such as Dorothy 
Hodgson that  rights-based discourses, “with their presumption of an 
individual, secular, gendered subject and their reliance on state-run 
legal systems as the mechanisms of implementation and enforcement, 
can ever be a truly emancipatory strategy for women.”87 This is a 
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study, therefore, of the lived-experience of gender-based injustice as 
the “assumptions, meanings, ideas, and practices that shape and are 
shaped by people’s everyday interactions”88 in this case, the “culture” 
of rule of law and criminal justice legal fora. What we can see 
through such a study is the ways in which vocabularies of criminal 
justice intersect with, expand, inhibit or constrain other vocabularies 
that may, ultimately, be more productive in the contestation over 
social justice that is the basis for the ongoing rapes in the Congo. 
II 
NORMS AND VOCABULARIES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
Sexual Violence as defined in the main legal instruments that 
comprise international criminal justice has shifted from a limited 
definition of “physical violence of a sexual nature such as rape”89 to a 
broad definition of “attack on the sexuality of the victim that may or 
may not involve physical attack . . . harassment, sexual exploitation, 
sexual abuse, sexual assault . . . without the consent of the victim” or 
perceived by the victim to be of a sexual nature.90 The Rome Statute 
explicitly recognizes rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual 
violence as war crimes in international and non-international armed 
conflict as well as crimes against humanity.91 In addition to the crimes 
of sexual and gender-based violence listed above, persecution is 
included in the Rome Statute as a crime against humanity and 
specifically includes for the first time the recognition of gender as a 
basis for persecution.92 The Rome Statute also includes trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children, as a crime against 
humanity within the definition of the crime of enslavement.93  Finally, 
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2013] Testimony of Sexual Violence in the 245 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Injustice of Rape 
the Rome Statute adopts the definition of genocide as accepted in the 
1948 Genocide Convention.94 The Elements of Crimes (“EoC”) 
specify that “genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm” may 
include: “acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or 
degrading treatment.”95 Together, these are the definition of sexual 
violence as an “atrocity crime.” The DRC occupies a unique legal 
space in that the 2006 Rape Law has made the definitional elements 
and crimes included in the International Criminal Court statute part of 
the national law. Therefore, “NGOs have made a tremendous effort to 
educate and to explain the law to the community, the police, and the 
judiciary since its adoption.”96 
The norms and vocabularies that have emerged through 
international legal advocacy against sexual violence have shaped the 
way in which individual rape victims in the Congo must testify in 
order to access international justice. While this sentence rings true in 
general in regards to all legal norms and penal codes, the question 
here has to do with the scale of international obligations (to whom 
and what are the obligations addressed) and the costs of distortion to 
individual women’s lives who fail to frame their experience of rape in 
these terms and, therefore, ongoing failure to attain social justice. 
Although the Nuremberg court knew that rapes had occurred in 
World War II,97 rape was not addressed at Nuremberg. Silence was 
the norm. The publication of A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in a 
Conquered City: A Diary,98 an anonymous diary was controversial in 
post-war Germany where men felt they did not do enough to protect 
“their” women. Similarly, The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against 
Homosexuals99 was a testimony of the writer, writing under a 
pseudonym of the brutality and rape he endured as a gay man. These 
singular testimonies provided a space through which others who 
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experienced such sexual violence in the war could begin to form a 
collective memory of rape that the Nuremberg or post war trials in 
Germany did not.100 
The first time testimony of rape became the focus of a trial was the 
moment in the Akeyesu trial in the ICTR when Justice Pillay asked the 
witness to elaborate on her mention of rape as she was being 
questioned about the events in Taba. This was the moment when a 
collective memory of sexual violence in the Rwandan Genocide and, 
ultimately, in mass atrocity, could begin to form. In the first 
international conviction of sexual violence as an atrocity crime, the 
prosecutor had originally failed to investigate and charge acts of 
sexual violence.101 John Paul Akayesu, who served as bourgmestre of 
Taba Commune during Rwanda’s 1994 genocide was one of the first 
individuals to be arrested and prosecuted by the ICTR. At the time of 
his arrest, he was charged with direct responsibility for genocide, 
complicity in genocide, incitement to genocide, the crimes against 
humanity of extermination and murder, and the war crime of murder. 
In their analysis of the case, Susana SaCouto and Katherine Cleary 
state that “shortly after the start of trial, a witness called to testify 
about the murder of most members of her family mentioned—‘in an 
almost offhand way’—that her six-year-old daughter had been 
raped.”102 In response to questioning by members of the Tribunal, 
which included Judge Navanethem Pillay, the only female judge on 
the ICTR at the time, the witness stated that she had never been 
questioned about the rape by ICTR investigators.103 She further 
testified that she “had heard that other girls had been raped in 
Akayesu’s bureau communal, but she had not seen it herself.”104 Two 
months later, another Prosecution witness was called to testify about 
an attack on her house that her family had tried to flee, and ended up 
telling the story of her capture, rape, and abandonment.105 This 
witness also discussed her attempt to find refuge in the bureau 
communal, where she witnessed women and girls being raped by 
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communal police and Interahamwe in the presence of the accused.106 
Although neither the Prosecution nor the Defense followed up on this 
testimony, the three judges asked her to elaborate on Akayesu’s 
whereabouts and actions during the rapes.107 
Following Akayesu, a number of amended indictments were filed 
in cases before the ICTR to include charges of rape and other forms 
of sexual violence.108 Taking into account only the number of 
indictments containing counts of sexual violence, one might have an 
optimistic view that rape victims were finally being given access to 
justice. Indeed, more that half of the indictments issued by the ICTR 
Office of the Prosecutor between 1995 and 2002 were counts of 
sexual violence109 But a detailed analysis of trends in the prosecution 
of sexual violence in the ICTR from November 1995 through 
November 2002, shows that the number of indictments of sexual 
violence leveled-off between 1996 and 2001, and then decreased 
sharply through the end of 2002.110 In two of the later cases in which 
crimes of sexual violence were charged, the Prosecution later sought 
to withdraw the charges due to insufficient evidence.111 The reason, 
according to the report is that “testimony” is “the Gordian Knot of the 
Prosecutor’s work, both due to the imperative necessity of assembling 
the case files and the difficulty of finding witnesses.”112 According to 
the report the difficulties in finding witnesses are due to the doubt of 
women’s NGOs and female victims regarding the Tribunal’s real 
capacity to prosecute sexual violence. Even after the Akayesu 
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to the country. . . . Moreover, women who were victims of sexual violence during the 
genocide have immediate needs other than their need for justice or recognition of these 
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silence” on the issue of investigation of allegations of sexual violence 
or “items of evidence regarding sexual violence were knowingly kept 
quiet by the prosecution under a strategy defined by the 
Prosecutor.”113 In the Serushago case, the rape charge was dropped 
from the indictment in favor of the other counts which gave “female 
victims and women’s associations the impression that crimes of 
sexual violence are not treated with the same degree of seriousness 
and importance as other crimes.”114 
Whereas rape was mainly added as amendments to trials that were 
already started in the ICTR, the Foca Rape trial in the ICTY was the 
first time that prosecutors put forth the charge of rape as the center of 
prosecution. The Foca trial concerned Serbian commander, Dragoljub 
Kunarac arrested in 1999 by the ICTY. The legal question was 
whether the acts of these soldiers were collective or simply individual 
acts of depravity. The prosecution argued that the use of rape in 
attacks on civilians was widespread and systematic. For the first time, 
the theory of the case was that rape, as a tactic of war and genocide, 
was repeated and continuous. They maintained that the Serbian 
methods of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was “widespread” and 
“systematic” and that there was a chain of command such that rape 
was occurring with his knowledge and he did not intervene to stop it. 
Whereas the assumption in domestic law of rape is that the woman 
consented to the sexual act unless it could be demonstrated that she 
was forced to have sex under the Foca standard, there could no longer 
be implied consent during violent conflict. 
Together, the Akeyesu and the Foca Rape trials enabled the 
formation of a collective account of rape as genocide and a crime 
against humanity. These collective accounts, however, had the 
unintended effect of silencing the experience of rape for those who 
did not fit into this collective account. In other words, the collective 
memory of rape as inscribed in recent court trials has not contributed 
to fostering access to justice for the individual experience of rape 
when that individual experience diverges from the official account 
that emerges as the collective memory. As Buss has noted, “Rape” as 
official collective account of mass atrocity has a hyper-visibility 
(credibility excess) while peacetime or individual rape in atrocity 
remains relative invisible (credibility deficit).115 She explains that: 
 
113 Id. at 8. 
114 Id. 
115 Doris E. Buss, Rethinking ‘Rape as a Weapon of War,’ 17 FEM. LEG. STUD. 145, 
153–54 (2009). 
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 Part of the process by which types of harms and categories of 
victims are rendered invisible or un-seeable is through the act of 
defining and sorting crimes. The legal categorisation of war crimes 
does more than merely recognise as criminal different types of 
harm. It also provides a “grammar of pain” (Ross 2003, p. 1); a 
language by which the Tribunal can identify, and witnesses can 
testify to, their experiences of (legally recognised) harm (Ross 
2003; Campbell 2007). As categories of harm, rape as a crime 
against humanity and rape as genocide structure not only which 
harms are recounted (and which are not), but also the subjects who 
can speak to those harms.116 
Karen Engle117 studied how testimonies were collected preceding 
the ICTY trials. She noted the way in which journalists and others 
who investigated the rapes made assumptions about the reasons why a 
testifier would not testify to having been raped (the assumption was 
that all Muslim women were raped). The following are two accounts 
she documented that bring out this problem: 
I asked Mersiha, but what about you? She looked at her mother, 
sitting there and listening, as if asking her for permission to say 
more. “No, it did not happen to me,” she said, but I doubted her. 
Maybe, if empathy can break the wall of self-protection 
. . .  
All of those who investigated the war rapes in Bosnia have noted 
that the silence of the victims was the biggest, and often invisible, 
obstacle to discovering the truth. My own experience confirms this. 
The silence of the victims during my investigation was also my 
adversary. Very often I felt as if I were standing in front of a wall, 
yet it was human beings, not bricks, that were in front of me. 
Human beings who were unhappy, shamed, humiliated and lost. 
Such shame and humiliation explained the silence for others as 
well.118 
The testimonies that have gained access to the ICTY and ICTR as 
part of the prosecutions theory that genocide and crimes against 
humanity are limited by a “rape script.” Testimony of sexual violence 
is transformed into genocide vocabularies of sexual mutilation, the 
practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes, 
and prohibition of marriages so that rape can be articulated as a 
measure to prevent births within the target ethnic group. Women who 
 
116 Id. at 155. 
117 Karen Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 778 (2005). 
118 Id. at 795 (Journalist, Slavenka Drakuli); see also SEADA VRANIC, BREAKING THE 
WALL OF SILENCE, X (Zagreb 1996). 
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chose to marry the rapist or view the baby as being of their own 
ethnic group are problematic. This legal theory continues to 
perpetuate the patriarchal society understanding that membership of a 
group is determined by the identity of the father. In the ICTR the 
official understanding of rape that emerged through the Akayesu trial 
was that Hutu men raped Tutsi women in order to cleanse Rwanda of 
Tutsi by conquering women’s wombs. On account of this legal 
theory, Hutu rapes went unheard. Rape as genocide assumes that 
through forced impregnation the womb becomes “occupied” and the 
woman is no longer capable of bearing a child of her own ethnicity. 
Critics of this legal approach point out that, while portending to 
emancipate women, this legal approach continues and fosters 
patrimonial understandings of the woman’s body.119 
In all accounts, women can only play the role of “victims” acted 
upon “against their will,” not as having exercised a choice or as 
perpetrators or political agents who join rebels because they want to 
fight.120 The problem with this is that in the prosecutorial push for a 
legal theory of rape as genocide or weapon of war, it creates a 
vocabulary and normative order for rapes that cross this threshold as 
morally outrageous and, by definition, those who cannot speak within 
this vocabulary are silenced, rejected or ignored as having 
experienced private acts, motivated by overwhelming sexual desire. 
Similarly, in the case of asylum, while rape and sexual violence can 
amount to persecution under the 1951 Convention and European law, 
it has often been dismissed in practice as a criminal act committed by 
individuals. “A Ugandan woman, Rose Najjemba, for example, was 
raped by Ugandan soldiers questioning her about a rebel group, but 
her asylum claim was initially turned down on the grounds that, ‘there 
was nothing in the evidence . . . to suggest that the incident was 
anything more than a very serious criminal act of sexual gratification 
on the part of the soldiers.’”121 While there has been greater 
international awareness of rape as an atrocity crime, there continues 
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to be ambiguity surrounding rape as persecution which results in low 
rates of asylum for gender based persecution.122 
One can conclude, therefore, that the normative framework of rape 
as an atrocity crime has been path breaking, but not as progressive as 
the doctrinal recognition might suggest. Collectivizing the experience 
of rape as genocide and a weapon of war points to the deeper 
problems that still exist in recognizing the “harm” and “injustice” of 
rape. It turns out that the individual experience of rape is incompatible 
with collective knowledge and truth necessary for international 
prosecution. This problem can be seen, in particular, through the 
concept of “command responsibility.” Rather than addressing root 
causes of sexual violence such as poverty, sovereign control of 
wealth, land disputes, and complex social relations, the legal theory of 
command responsibility as argued in these trials attempts to simplify 
the complexity of criminality into the body of a singular person: the 
commander.123 As Clarke argues, “this articulation of criminal 
responsibility in the defence of the victim has had the opposite of its 
intended effect by producing what Jacques Raniciere [sic] (2004) has 
called disembodied political subjects that allow agency to be 
reassigned to the institutionally powerful in their name.”124 
In the end, these legal theories create a normative framework that 
becomes disconnected from the local context of rape. Rosa Brooks 
insightfully wrote that “the rule of law is a culture, yet the human-
rights-law and foreign-policy communities know very little—and 
manifest little curiosity—about the complex processes by which 
cultures are created and changed.”125 Lincoln adds that: 
[c]ultural norms permeate many of the factors that contribute to the 
sexual violence crisis. In fact, Erturk cautions against singling out 
sexual violence from the ‘continuum of violence that Congolese 
women experience’ which seems ‘to be perceived by large sectors 
of society to be normal.’ Certain preexisting norms have helped 
create the problem by contributing to judges’ unwillingness to hear 
claims of sexual violence and the reluctance of police to investigate 
allegations. Cultural norms also prompt traditional self-help 
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remedies such as forced marriage, that reify a woman’s second-
class status in society. This point does not warrant outright rejection 
of the rule of law as a solution to the sexual violence crisis. Nor 
does it deny that laws do have some norm-creating capacity. 
Christine Bell writes, ‘in transitional societies, law must be both the 
subject and object of change: It must simultaneously both produce 
change and be changed itself.’ Most agree that impunity for 
perpetrators is a significant problem in the perpetuation of sexual 
violence, and appropriate laws can help alleviate this impunity by 
offering some measure of deterrence. In light of these 
considerations, practitioners should be aware of the limits of the 
rule of law and should focus on—or find partners who can invest 
in—efforts to change detrimental preexisting norms and rebuild 
norms that have been fractured by conflict.126 
To sum up, international criminal justice, which stems from a 
moral outrage of rape, has produced norms and vocabularies of rape 
as genocide and a weapon of war such as “systematic rape,” “sexual 
slavery,” and the “suffering of conscription” which limit the ability of 
courts to bear witness to the individual experience of rape that is 
much more complicated than these vocabularies suggest and tied to 
particular local contexts that often predate the mass atrocity in regards 
to women’s bodies. The question, therefore, is how does the creation 
of a military, criminal justice narratives relate to the local context of 
the injustice of rape? And, in particular, do these narratives empower 
or hinder and constrain the discursive power of testimony as a space 
where women can contest the terms of their membership and foster 
social justice? 
III 
TESTIMONIAL DISCOURSE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN DR CONGO 
AND EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 
The legal process of international criminal trials leads to the 
collection of atrocity testimony as an activity of the prosecution and 
defense teams through which the goal is to have as many victims and 
witnesses as possible testify and confirm the theory of the case, the 
end goal of which is to end impunity for sexual violence by bringing 
perpetrators to justice. In the process of bringing about social justice 
and transformation, on the other hand, testifying is an activity through 
which an excluded or marginalized group or individual seeks to gain 
recognition and, ultimately, membership. In the post-conflict setting, 
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where actors seek transitional justice through truth-commissions, 
testifying is an act that victims and others engage in who have 
experienced or witnessed atrocity. Whereas atrocity testimony places 
the victim in a passive role in need of protection in a system that is 
almost exclusively focused on the perpetrator, testimonial discourse is 
an active contestation over membership and the right to speak one’s 
truth. Testimonial discourse is a political ritual situated on the 
periphery of citizenship that serves as a precursor to political 
membership.127 Those who speak of testimony work recognize that 
“the terms of the aspiration must be negotiated, amended, and 
compromised; through that process, new fictions will be derived to 
meet the memories of our past and the needs of our pluralist social 
worlds.”128 
When we reconsider the sexual violence cases from the standpoint 
of the discursive function of testimony work, we are better able to see 
the way in which these international criminal trials commit, what 
Miranda Fricker has termed, “Epistemic Injustices.”129 Testimonial 
injustice is a philosophical understanding of the failure to treat a 
person as a source of knowledge. A hermeneutic injustice occurs 
when a society lacks a conceptual framework for understanding the 
experiences of someone who has been treated badly. Posing the 
question of testimony regarding rape in criminal trials from the 
perspective of epistemic injustice one might ask, does atrocity 
testimony silence, reject or ignore testimonies of the injustice of rape 
as it is experienced in a local context? The argument is that epistemic 
injustice limits testimony in its discursive function as political ritual 
of claims to citizenship. 
The following sections present an analysis of the Lubanga trial in 
the ICC and the trial of Kibibi in a mobile gender court in Baraka, 
DRC through the lens of epistemic injustice as we consider how the 
silencing, rejecting and ignoring of testimony in these cases limits the 
discursive function of testimony. 
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A. Lubanga Case 
Charges for gender-based crimes have been brought in six of the 
seven Situations before the ICC (Uganda, the DRC, the CAR, Darfur, 
Kenya and Ivory Coast) and eleven of the total sixteen cases currently 
before the Court.130 This represents sixteen individual suspects out of 
the twenty-nine total accused by the ICC and, of these sixteen, five 
are from the DRC. Although sexual violence charges include causing 
serious bodily or mental harm, rape, sexual slavery, other forms of 
sexual violence, torture, persecution, other inhumane acts, cruel or 
inhumane treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity,131 particular 
legal theories pursued by the prosecutor have ultimately limited 
witness testimony that would substantiate these charges. 
Although sexual violence has been widespread, the Prosecution of 
the DRC Situation has focused on North and South Kivu and mainly 
on the particular area of Ituri in North Kivu and, even more particular, 
on specific incidents such as the attack on Bogoro Village resulting in 
six total arrest warrants issued, four of whom have been arrested.132 
The Court’s first trial was against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga 
Case) that concluded in August 2011 and the Court’s first trial 
judgment was issued in the Lubanga case in March 2012. Lubanga 
was convicted of the enlistment, conscription, and use of child 
soldiers and sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment. The Chamber 
and final judgment described the conflict in terms similar to the 
official narrative noted above and the specific place where the crimes 
took place, Ituri, as “fertile and rich in resources, such as gold, 
diamonds, oil, timber and coltan, and noted that the experts suggested 
that much of the violence was economically motivated, including 
exploitation of the social unrest by the Ugandan national army for 
economic advantage.”133 Although it noted Congo’s 450 ethnic 
groups and the ethnic divisions between the Hema and Lendu that 
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have been ongoing, the local context of rape, in its cultural and social 
dimensions that cut across ethic lines, was never mentioned. The 
emphasis on only one village and one particular narrative of violence 
led local women’s rights activists to wonder “why the Hema 
militiamen were not prosecuted for sexual violence perpetrated 
against Ntigi and Lendu women. ‘Does a Hema woman deserve more 
protection than her sisters belonging to other ethnic groups?’ asked an 
activist.”134 
Charges of sexual violence have had a shaky history in these early 
years of the Court. As documented in the Gender Report Card: 
Charges for gender-based crimes, when they have been brought, 
have been particularly susceptible to being dropped, or in some 
instances re-characterised, in the early stages of proceedings, in 
particular seeking the issuance of an arrest warrant or summons to 
appear, and the confirmation of charges phase. Gender-based crimes 
were not charged in the Lubanga case, as discussed in detail later in 
this Report and as raised by the Women’s Initiatives in 2006, as the 
first NGO to file before the Court. No case containing charges of 
gender-based crimes has yet reached the stage of a trial or appeal 
judgement, although the case against Katanga & Ngudjolo, 
containing charges of rape and sexual slavery, is awaiting trial 
judgement.135 
According to the Gender Report Card, as of June 17, 2012, fifty 
percent of the charges for gender-based crimes sought by the Office 
of the Prosecutor had been dismissed before trial state of the 
proceedings.136 In the cases against militia leaders Germain Katanga 
and Mathieu Ngudjolo, prosecutors dropped all sexual violence 
charges following disagreements with the court’s registry over how to 
protect two witnesses whose testimonies could have backed up the 
charges.137 The Prosecution had relocated witnesses in order to protect 
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them without the consent of the court’s registry and, in response, the 
judges excluded the women’s statements, interview notes, and 
interview transcripts from being used in the confirmation of charges 
hearing for Katanga and Ngudjolo138 since the Prosecution’s actions 
had undermined the credibility of the testimony. The evidence was, 
ultimately, reintroduced, the Chamber confirmed the charges of rape 
and sexual slavery, but then found the evidence insufficient to 
confirm the specific charges that would “establish substantial grounds 
to believe that the suspects intended for rape and sexual slavery to be 
committed during the attack on Bogoro village, or even in the 
aftermath of the Bogoro attack, or to establish the suspects’ 
knowledge that rape and sexual slavery would be committed by the 
combatants in the ordinary course of events.”139 And, “[i]n the 
decision issuing the Arrest Warrant for Ntaganda in July 2012, the 
Chamber signaled that the evidence supporting the allegation of 
sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, which consisted of two 
witness statements and other circumstantial evidence, may not be 
sufficient to reach the standard of proof required at future stages of 
proceedings.”140 The same problem existed in the Mbarushimana 
Case that led to the Chambers conclusion that the requisite standard 
of proof had not been met that the acts were committed by the FDLR, 
even though it was convinced the crimes had been committed.141 
Significantly, “the Chamber noted that those witnesses who did speak 
about or acknowledge this order, ‘mostly do so after specific, explicit 
and insistent prompting by the investigator, and they attach to such 
order a meaning that is different to that which is alleged by the 
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Prosecution.’”142 Most recently, Trial Chamber II unanimously 
acquitted Ngudjolo stating that the ruling should not be taken to imply 
the crimes were not committed, just that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that he was the commander during the attack on 
Bogoro.143 The failures in being able to present witness testimony 
point to a limitation of the norms of testifying and vocabulary of the 
legal theories concerning sexual violence in the ICC. As a result, most 
of the Prosecution’s evidence has been open source documents from 
international organizations such as Human Rights Watch that have 
been among the core manufacturers of the sexual violence vocabulary 
of rape as a weapon of war.144 The disjuncture between the 
internationally formed vocabulary and the testimony of witnesses can 
be seen in the problems the prosecution has faced in the court through 
its use of intermediaries. In the Lubanga trial, the Prosecution, the 
Chamber found, had placed undue reliance on three principle 
intermediaries that “created the significant possibility that they 
improperly influenced witnesses to falsify their testimony, rendering 
most of it unreliable.”145 
The Prosecution did not originally charge Lubanga with gender-
based crimes, despite reports by the United Nations and other sources 
relating to their commission by the UPC soldiers Forces Patriotiques 
pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) of which he was the Commander 
in Chief.146 Instead, the Prosecution chose to focus on the use of child 
soldiers. The Chamber took note, however, that of the 129 victims 
whom it had authorized (34 female and 95 male), many had alleged 
“that they had suffered harm as a result of other crimes, such as 
sexual violence and torture or other forms of ill-treatment,” which 
were not the subject of charges against the accused.”147 It also stated 
that not all of the facts set forth by the Prosecution fell within the 
parameters of the facts and circumstances described in the 
confirmation of charges decision, namely, “the use of girls as sexual 
slaves together with the resulting unwanted pregnancies.”148 In other 
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words, the issue of sexual violence came up repeatedly in the context 
of conscription of female recruits throughout the trial. 
The undercurrent of sexual violence throughout the trial was 
largely due to the efforts of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender 
Justice. When they heard that there would not be specific charges for 
sexual violence in the Lubanga trial they reported: 
The DRC has one of the highest rates of sexual violence in the 
world. The Ituri region, where the UPC operates, continues to 
experience ongoing conflict and militia attacks, and eastern DRC 
has been described by Margot Wallström, the United Nations 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict, as the ‘rape capital of the world.’ 
 It was therefore shocking to many of us that the announcement 
in 2006 of the case against Thomas Lubanga did not include 
charges for such crimes and overlooked the suffering of thousands 
of victims of this conflict and victims of this militia. It was 
unimaginable to us and to our partners in eastern DRC, grassroots 
women’s rights and peace advocates, that the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) had not investigated these crimes in their initial 
strategy. It was also beyond comprehension that the OTP then 
decided not to undertake any specific investigations into these 
crimes in the six months between when Mr. Lubanga was taken into 
ICC custody in March 2006 and before the Confirmation Hearing in 
November of that year. Still further, the OTP did not investigate 
these crimes between the Confirmation Hearing and the start of the 
trial two years later in January 2009. In fact, there was almost three 
years from when Mr. Lubanga was taken into custody until the trial 
started—plenty of time in which the OTP could have conducted 
investigations of gender-based crimes in relation to child soldiers, 
thereby expanding thematically on their original charges and 
providing a more accurate reflection of the crime base. In our view, 
the OTP could have amended the document containing the charges, 
sought and held a Confirmation Hearing on such charges and still 
have been ready for trial three years later, with the rights of the 
accused to prepare his defense fully observed.149 
In May and July 2006, the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice had 
conducted two documentation missions in Ituri, eastern DRC, and 
interviewed victims/survivors of gender based violence, committed by 
a range of militias including the UPC. They produced a dossier 
detailing fifty-five individual interviews with predominantly women 
victims/survivors of rape and other forms of sexual violence. Of 
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these, thirty-one interviewees were victims/survivors specifically of 
acts of rape and sexual slavery allegedly committed by the UPC. On 
August 16, 2006, the Women’s Initiatives submitted their dossier and 
a letter to the Office of the Prosecutor describing their concerns that 
gender-based crimes committed by the UPC had not been adequately 
investigated in the case against Mr. Lubanga. The dossier provided 
information about the commission of these crimes, indicated that 
sexual violence appeared to be an integral component of the attacks 
against the civilian population, provided material suggesting a pattern 
of rape, abduction, sexual slavery, and torture by the UPC, and 
confirmed that women victims/survivors were willing to be 
interviewed by the ICC. When the OTP never responded to this 
dossier, the Women’s Initiatives became the first NGO to file 
observations under Rule 103 before the Court, concerning the absence 
of charges for gender-based crimes in the Lubanga case. On May 22, 
2009, the Legal Representatives for Victims jointly requested the 
Trial Chamber to consider modifying the legal characterization of the 
facts to include inhuman and cruel treatment, and sexual slavery to 
the existing charges, pursuant to Regulation 55. Although granted by 
a majority decision of the Trial Chamber, this was overturned on 
appeal.150 Even though the case proceeded without any further 
charges being brought, evidence of sexual violence was heard 
throughout the trial. 
Legal Representative of Victims, Carine Bapita Buyangandu, 
outlined the historical context of the conflict and described the ill-
treatment of children in the training camps. She noted that children in 
training camps were beaten and sometimes killed, were given poor 
food, inadequate training and no access to medical care, and that 
“they raped and they were raped.” Bapita also explained the specific 
abuse of girl child soldiers in the training camps, who—in addition to 
receiving the same training and treatment as boy child soldiers—were 
also used as sexual slaves, became pregnant, had unwanted children, 
performed household chores, and were used to actively participate in 
hostilities by means of scouting, looting, killing, and fighting. She 
suggested to the Chamber that these criminal acts against girls should 
be considered as aggravating circumstances to the crime of enlistment 
and conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen and using 
them to participate actively in hostilities. 
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The Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice analysis of the publicly 
available testimony indicates that “of the majority of the Prosecution 
witnesses who testified during the presentation of the Prosecution 
case in 2009, at least 21 out of 25, testified in open court about girl 
soldiers, and a significant number of Prosecution witnesses, at least 
15, also testified about gender-based crimes, in particular rape and 
sexual slavery” even though none of this testimony was relied on by 
the Chamber in convicting Lubanga.151 
In its closing arguments “[t]he Prosecution urged the Chamber to 
make clear that the girls forced into marriage with commanders were 
not the wives of commanders but victims of recruitment, and should 
be particularly protected by demobilisation programs and by the 
ICC.”152 After the closing statements of the Prosecution in the 
Lubanga Case, Judge Odio-Benito noted that, despite submissions on 
sexual violence being included in the Prosecution’s final brief and 
closing arguments, charges of sexual violence had not been included 
in the document containing the charges or included within the charges 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Making reference to Article 74, 
Judge Odio-Benito asked: “How is sexual violence relevant to this 
case, and how does the Prosecution expect the Trial Chamber to refer 
to the sexual violence allegedly suffered by girls if this was not in the 
facts and circumstances described in the charges against Mr Lubanga 
Dyilo?”153 Although the question was directed at Deputy Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo, seated in the 
back of the courtroom and chided earlier for using email in the 
courtroom, was granted permission by the Chamber to answer this 
question. He stated: 
We believe the facts are that the girls were abused, used as sexual 
slaves and raped. We believe this suffering is part of the suffering 
of the conscription. We did not allege and will not present evidence 
linking Thomas Lubanga with rapes. We allege that he linked it 
with the conscription and he knows the harsh conditions. So what 
we believe in this case is a different way to present the gender 
crimes. It presents the gender crimes not specific as rapes. Gender 
crimes were committed as part of the conscription of girls in—in 
the militias. And it is important to have the charge as confined to 
the inscription, because if not . . . the girls are considered wife and 
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ignored as people to be protected and demobilised and cared. That 
is why the Prosecutor decided to confine the charges—to present 
the suffering and the sexual abuse and the gender crime suffered by 
the girls in the camps just as conscription, showing this gender 
aspect of the crime. The Prosecutor went on to explain that the 
Prosecution believed a commander’s order to abduct girls to use 
them as sexual slaves or rape them was an order to use the children 
in hostilities.154 
Judge Fulford stated that: “Mr. Ocampo’s submission differed from 
that presented by Ms. Samson’s argument—who had reasoned that 
sexual violence against female child soldiers was an aspect of their 
direct participation in hostilities. . .”155 When Ocampo “instructed the 
bench to accept his argument over Ms. Sampson’s, since he is the 
Chief Prosecutor . . . Judge Fulford promised to ‘ignore’ Mr. 
Ocampo’s remark.”156 Ocampo presented this new conceptual 
framework as a last ditch effort to give voice to the invisible 
experience of female conscripts as a distinct category of child 
soldiers. While laudable in seeking to expand the vocabulary of 
“suffering of conscription,” it proved too little and too late. The trial 
judgment, in the end, does not consider sexual violence stating: 
Regardless of whether sexual violence may properly be included 
within the scope of “using [children under the age of 15] to 
participate actively in hostilities” as a matter of law, because facts 
relating to sexual violence were not included in the Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, it would be impermissible for the 
Chamber to base its Decision pursuant to Article 74(2) on the 
evidence introduced during the trial that is relevant to this issue.157 
In its Gender Report Card 2012, the Women’s Initiatives noted: 
The absence of any factual findings related to the sexual violence 
committed against recruits in the trial judgment, and its exclusion 
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from the definition of the crimes for which Lubanga was convicted, 
rendered these aspects of the crimes invisible, and impeded their 
consideration for the purposes of sentencing. Furthermore, it 
resulted in the omission of the harm suffered primarily by female 
recruits in the assessment of the gravity of the crime.158 
In a dissenting opinion, 
Judge Odio Benito found that sexual violence was an ‘intrinsic’ 
aspect of the legal concept of ‘use to participate actively in the 
hostilities.’ She argued that the majority’s decision not to include 
sexual violence within the concept of ‘use to participate actively in 
the hostilities’ rendered this aspect of the crime invisible. Judge 
Odio Benito stated that the: ‘invisibility of sexual violence in the 
legal concept leads to discrimination against the victims of 
enlistment, conscription and use who systematically suffer from this 
crime as an intrinsic part of the involvement with the armed group’. 
Specifically, she argued that the Chamber had a ‘duty’ to include 
sexual violence within the legal definition of ‘use to participate 
actively in the hostilities’, regardless of the ‘impediment of the 
Chamber’ to base its decision on this aspect of the crime pursuant to 
Article 74(2) of the Statute.159 
As this section has shown, prosecution in the ICC, on numerous 
levels, fails to treat the individual women who have testified to rape 
as a source of knowledge about the harm she has experienced through 
the act of rape. Investigative teams silence women through 
intermediaries charged with finding testimonies that correspond to the 
rape scripts. Most of the testimonies collected by organizations such 
as the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice have been ignored as a 
result of legal theories that fail to see women, who do not fall within 
the legal theory, as testifiers.160 Other times, even when they do fall 
within the legal theory, victim testimony is rejected through norms 
regarding the credibility of evidence. The next section examines 
mobile gender courts through the lens of hermeneutic injustice in that 
these trials are taking place in a local societal context that 
fundamentally lacks the conceptual framework (or local vocabulary) 
for understanding the experience of a rape victim as someone who has 
been treated badly. 
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B. Kibibi Trial 
As mentioned above, the DRC national penal code includes sexual 
offences as crimes against humanity, as provided by the Rome 
Statute. The military law, however, “did not follow the detailed ICC 
definition of the crime of sexual violence. Therefore, military judges 
had to fill the gap in the law.”161 At the local level, military courts 
have jurisdiction to hear cases of sexual violence committed by 
military personnel as defined by the penal code.162 Victims enter these 
proceedings as civil parties. Prosecution for non-military rapes takes 
place in the criminal courts with civil action for reparations being 
stayed until the criminal court issues a final judgment. A victim who 
seeks reparations can either join the penal action or must wait for a 
judgment to use in the action before the civil jurisdiction to claim 
reparations. Either way, she must pay a fee to receive the judgment 
and, if she pursues civil action, to lodge the complaint. In 2010 the 
mobile gender justice courts in South Kivu heard a total of 186 
military cases with 95 convictions for rape while the civil mobile 
courts have heard 49 cases.163 After identifying the major obstacles as 
being a shortage of magistrates and difficulty for victims to access 
courts given the lack of infrastructure in the eastern provinces, the 
international community supported the creation of mobile gender 
courts. The idea of the Mobile Gender Court is to bring the court to 
the villages where the rapes occurred. Congolese Judges and lawyers 
conduct the trials that are overseen and funded by the Open Society 
Institute with implementing partners including the ABA ROLI 
program, Lawyers Without Borders, and USAID. 
In February 2011, I attended the first three days of the ten day 
Mobile Court Trial of Lt. Col. Kibibi Mutuara in Baraka. The trial 
concerned rapes in Fizi that had occurred on New Year’s Day. This 
was the highest-ranking officer ever to be prosecuted locally for the 
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crime of sexual violence. The Open Society official Report of the 
Trial, “Justice in DRC,” states that: 
On New Year’s Day, 2011, soldiers from the Congolese army 
descended on the town of Fizi, raping dozens of women and looting 
property in a terrifying night of violence. Six weeks later, 
Lieutenant Colonel Kibibi Mutuara, the commanding officer who 
ordered the attack, and 10 other soldiers were brought to trial before 
the mobile court. During the two-week session, prosecutors 
presented evidence, including the testimonies of 49 women who 
were raped, while defense counsel sought to rebut the charges. 
Hundreds of onlookers gathered each day to follow the trial. Kibibi 
and three of his officers were each found guilty and sentenced to 20 
years in prison. Five enlisted men were also convicted and 
sentenced to 10 or 15 years in prison. One soldier was acquitted and 
one was found to be a minor and transferred to another domestic 
court.164 
While not untrue, the Open Society Foundation’s characterization 
of the trial omits some of the facts that complicate the local situation. 
For example, what sparked the incident was a fight over a girl in a 
bar. One of the soldiers, not wearing a uniform, had tried to pick up a 
local woman. Her boyfriend, angered, attacked the soldier, who later 
died. The soldiers looted the village in retaliation for the death of the 
soldier. These additional facts highlight how the official narrative of 
the incident and vocabulary of rape as a weapon of war causes 
distortions of the local context that result in a lack of “buy in” by the 
local population of what they see as a foreign tribunal. In the case of 
Fizi, the particular vocabulary of the rape as command authority and 
perpetrated by Congolese soldiers misses the relevant fact, on one 
side, that these were ex-CNDP (Tutsi) rebels integrated into the 
FARDC and, on the other side, that all of these men and boys, on that 
particular night, were not wearing uniforms. By classifying the 
incident as the Congolese military under the command authority of 
Kibibi, it inscribes only the identities that have to do with war and 
conflict, ultimately, shaping justice that end up ignoring the 
experience of victims as speakers of their social condition. 
The Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice similarly highlighted 
the disparity between the official narrative and the local context. On 
their website they highlight one of the victims interviewed in their 
publication, Our Voices Matter, who was among the 63 women who 
were raped by Kibibi’s FARDC soldiers during the Fizi New Year’s 
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mass rape. As they document, following the sentence, the Congolese 
Government declared that it would compensate each victim with USD 
10,000. However, no action has been taken to compensate 
victims/survivors of this case. They then quote the interviewee as 
saying, “We won the trial in Baraka but until now we haven’t even 
received copies of the judgement [sic]. The government told us that it 
would compensate us, but since then we haven’t seen anyone come to 
us, neither the authorities nor the judges.”165 
Drawing out more of the descriptive elements of the trial helps to 
situate the performance of testimony in its local context. The trial 
itself was staged in an open-air forum, and most of the bench seating 
within the forum was taken up by local NGOs and journalists. 
Hanging on the walls of the forum upon which police officers stood 
with their guns, were locals, mainly men, who had to be often 
reminded of court decorum as they broke out in laughter over matters 
such as the limited schooling of the accused. And, just across a small 
bridge a stone’s throw away, stood a military vehicle full of Kibibi’s 
men “patrolling” the population. The 43rd Sector had been stationed 
in Fizi and was Kibibi’s stronghold. Although “a big fish” and a high-
profile case, there was a prison, but no key could be found, to secure 
the accused. When I asked why there were hardly any women present, 
I was told that they were working in the fields or at the market. 
Whereas for something like a V-Day celebration it was acceptable for 
women to attend, a trial could bring problems. Most of the people I 
spoke with saw the trial as more of a spectacle for the international 
community because, as has been their experience, afterwards the 
perpetrators go free. And, even if he was in prison, I was told that the 
“bandits” who work with him would still be there unless the 43rd 
Sector was replaced fully. 
Not only was this the highest-ranking official ever charged for rape 
in a nationally based court, it was also one of the shortest timeframes 
within which a trial had been brought. The incidents had occurred on 
New Year’s Day 2011, and the trial was taking place a little over a 
month later. Because of the short timeframe, lawyers for the victims 
had not yet had a chance to meet with their clients who were being 
hidden in safe houses. The night before the trial began, Maitre 
Thérèse Kulungu, the only female lawyer on the case, prepared her 
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opening statement, writing down notes until she quickly ran out of 
paper. She also did not have a copy of the dossier which was in Uvira, 
a village hours away. A dossier can be 500 pages long and, with 
printing costs at $4 a page, the lawyers for the victims requested 
additional time to be able to view the court’s copy. 
Fifty-five women, ages nineteen through sixty, presented evidence 
for the trial with forty-seven testifying at the trial. Kibibi and three of 
his officers received twenty-year prison sentences while five more 
officers received shorter ones, and one was acquitted. Examining the 
sentences, one is struck by the short prison terms each of the 
convicted perpetrators received. In addition, no reparations were ever 
made to the women who continue to be social outcasts. 
What these two examples emphasize is the need to better 
understand how local testifiers and actors identify or not with the new 
vocabularies of sexual violence as an atrocity crime. Has the growth 
of criminal tribunals at the international and local level enlarged state 
or local capacity to understand the experience of Congolese women? 
How does this new vocabulary affect who gets heard and how they 
are heard? In other words, have the norms of criminal justice and new 
vocabularies been able to give voice to epistemic injustice such that 
testifiers are able to lay claim to the discourse of sexual violence in 
the DR Congo? Or has it further isolated them as nonmembers of 
society? We turn now to these questions through an exploration of the 
discourse of sexual violence in the DR Congo. 
IV 
TESTIFYING TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KIVU 
During my November 2011 trip to eastern Congo to monitor the 
elections, I met a woman at the Ihusi Hotel in Goma. She had worked 
for the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa, and we spoke over drinks at the 
restaurant about my research. At the time she told me that I should 
take a closer look at issues of drug addiction and poverty in Kinshasa. 
A few weeks after I returned, I received an email from her in which 
she wrote: 
Just wanted to share a few things with you since you are doing a 
study on rape here. First I need to share, I was a victim of rape by 
knife point in the US. He was convicted. Here there is a difference. 
Rape is still rape but MANY rapes that are reported here are from 
women who have men who are married and rely upon the money 
they get for being the “makango” spelling???? They have sex with 
the married man expecting to be the second wife. If they don’t 
become the second wife they report the man for rape. You have to 
be careful on the definition of rape here. Women who have sex with 
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men and not paid falls under rape . . . Not by a law here but it 
happens frequently, reporting the men for rape. Rape has many 
meanings here so please keep that in mind.166 
This was not the first time I had been given advice by westerners 
who had spent time locally, but who were not taking part in sexual 
violence programs, to keep in mind that most westerners come to the 
DRC and take away what they want to see about rape. During the two 
years that I collected testimony and conducted focus groups with 
women throughout South Kivu regarding civil trials for rape, I 
learned that most of Congolese women shared the view that women 
were misusing the Rape Law as a way in which to get money from 
men. On the other hand, none of the women I interviewed had ever 
received any compensation from a trial. Instead, what I learned is that 
the Rape Law has essentially created another layer to the informal 
economy of corruption. Women would bring a case, but perpetrators 
paid off judges and the cases would be dropped. The perception in 
villages was that women who brought cases were behaving 
antisocially, and sympathy tended to go with the family of the man 
accused of rape who would no longer have its main source of income 
and, if put in prison, who have to find a way to care for him while he 
was there given that prisoners in the Congo receive no food and are 
kept in terrible conditions. 
These stories were at odds with the many judgments being issued 
for civil and criminal rapes in local courts. Most of the rapes that are 
brought to court at the local level are civil. This is because it has 
proven impossible to apprehend FDLR perpetrators since these rapes 
occur deep in the forests. A study of these civil rapes provides a 
picture of the local “cultures” of rape. The kinds of situations that 
lead to civil trial include girls who have turned to older men to pay 
their school fees. It is also still common for girls from poor families 
or out in remote villages such as Shabunda, to marry early. Girls 
sometimes freely choose early marriage, but this is now considered 
rape. In other instances, there are girls who are raped by men in the 
village to “marry” them. Local NGOs encourage girls and their 
families in these cases to bring a case against the man as a rape case. 
Many women or girls were raped while they were tending fields or on 
their way home. Even when the rape was by a soldier, they often 
indicated that the soldier was from the local village, a “bandit.” 
Finally, many rapes had to do with disputes over land. In all these 
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cases both the women I interviewed and the local NGOs stated that 
informal justice (where a mediation would take place) worked better 
than formal justice in terms of restoring the position of the rape victim 
in the community and allowing her to either continue to go to school 
or be cared for financially. 
In addition, local NGOs stated that the international focus was 
missing the point that most rape in the Congo is due to the rampant 
incest, domestic violence, exploitation of girls and use of “witchcraft” 
(drugs) by uncles and neighbors to take advantage of girls and 
women. As such, there was really no local understanding that the girl 
had been harmed. There was, however, an understanding that a rape 
law exists and that, therefore, rape is a crime. These two positions did 
not seem contradictory to the informants I interviewed. For example, 
magistrates and judges told me that they had no problem processing 
cases because there was the letter of the law. At the same time, 
however, the head of the court in Bukavu wanted me to understand 
that when a girl reaches puberty her body needs sex to mature 
properly. This was, according to him, a well-known fact. 
There seem to be separate normative understandings of the 
women’s lives, on the one hand, and the need to produce 
convictions/judgments in order to prove the success of rule of law 
programs. Local NGO partners, therefore, had lists of cases of women 
and men they were representing, but none of the women they had ever 
represented received any reparations from a civil or military judgment 
and all the women, by bringing a legal case, were shunned by their 
communities. Girls were thrown out of school once the community 
knew that her family had pursued a case in court, women told stories 
of being harassed by neighbors. All of them wanted to be able to 
relocate, but none had the funds to do so. 
One local NGO shared a video with me of their argument with a 
girl who had been abducted into the forest by and FDLR soldier. In 
the video she is arguing with the lawyer that she wants to marry the 
man. The lawyer told me that under the new laws, she was obligated 
to bring the case. He then relayed to me that he saw her in the village 
about a year later and she said to him, “are you happy now you got 
your justice? I married the man as I wanted.” 
The way in which local actors conveyed their perceptions of justice 
and stories recounted to me about local practices regarding the 
treatment of rape victims, are best understood as a contestation over 
membership and potential ways to address injustice. In focus groups 
and individual interviews, women who had participated in “know 
your rights” and women empowerment programs told me that using 
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these new vocabularies made them “delinquent women” in their 
communities. Delinquent meant that they were considered to no 
longer be carrying out the functions (taking care of children, tending 
the fields, etc.) of a woman. They also told me that the billboards that 
appear in Bukavu at circle intersections bring shame upon them. 
These billboards, expressive of rape as violence, portray women in 
shirts and pants being taken in force by men. The women did not see 
themselves in these billboards and conveyed that they gave men bad 
ideas about women who do not dress properly. 
If we understand the introduction of the Rape Law as having 
introduced new vocabularies that enable new forms of contestation 
over the terms of membership and injustice, we can see that the 
criminalization model, which has directed rule of law efforts towards 
certain projects (building courts, policing, rights based education 
programs, etc.) has also produced the need for social justice programs 
that would target domestic violence, incest, school fees, curricular 
programs that would emphasize the value of women in society, 
inheritance reforms, and support for women engaged in land disputes.  
Given the criminal justice focus, civil law reform and social justice 
has remained underdeveloped. The impunity agenda focuses mainly 
on the perpetrator while we see matters of social justice for the victim 
such as civil remedies and inequalities in the family and home being 
contested through narratives such as that expressed in the email by 
“J” which sees women as seeking to use rape as a way to claim 
resources in the community. 
CONCLUSION 
DUTIES OF BEARING WITNESS TO THE INJUSTICE OF RAPE 
The international criminal justice expression of, what I have 
termed, moral outrage concerning sexual violence through the 
vocabulary of command responsibility and rape as a weapon of war 
generates and supports an official narrative of rape in the DRC which, 
ultimately, does a disservice to victims of sexual and gender based 
violence as they strive to seek social justice. The underlying 
assumption of moral outrage is that rape is a singular horrific 
occurrence in a girl or woman’s life committed by a perpetrator who 
has behaved “criminally,” that is, outside the limits of how society 
defines acceptable behavior. Girls and women in the Congo, however, 
testify that rape is an ongoing part of their lives from early childhood 
through incest at home, the need to have sex to pay for school fees, 
and domestic violence after marriage and that the rape they were 
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asked to testify about for purposes of an international trial focused on 
the horrific experience of being gang raped or otherwise sexual 
assaulted by a soldier, is not the main horror in their lives. Their main 
horror concerns, what I have termed, the injustice of rape. Shifting the 
focus of efforts to combat rape in the DRC to the injustice of rape 
would allow victims to testify about their survival strategies in a 
society that devalues women to the extent they are in eastern DRC. 
 
 
